Operation Pawn Storm
Using Decoys to Evade Detection

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INTRODUCTION

Operation Pawn Storm refers to economic and political espionage attacks instigated by a group of threat actors primarily targeting military, embassy, and defense contractor personnel from the United States and its allies. Opposing factions to and dissidents of the Russian government, international media, and even the national security department of a U.S. ally were also targeted. The threat actors used three attack vectors—spear-phishing emails with malicious attachments, an advanced network of phishing websites, and exploits injected into legitimate Polish websites. Among the targets of the advanced phishing attacks were ACADEMI, a defense contractor formerly known as “Blackwater,” SAIC, and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE).

As discussed in this research paper, the attackers used a simple but clever JavaScript trick to target Microsoft™ Outlook® Web Access (OWA) users from the previously mentioned organizations. The OWA phishing attacks seemed effective and so could be particularly dangerous to any organization that allows employees to use OWA.

An in-depth look at six multistage attacks revealed one thing in common—the use of SEDNIT/Sofacy malware [1], [2]. The use of such multistage downloaders provided attackers additional protection against detection. We believe the threat actors aimed to confuse their targets’ IT administrators by making it hard for them to string attack components together, thus evading detection.

This research paper details when certain attacks occurred, what tools were used in attempts to get in to target networks, and target profiles to form a general picture of Operation Pawn Storm.
TIES THAT BIND THE OPERATION PAWN STORM ATTACKS TOGETHER

SEDNIT

SEDNIT malware are mostly backdoors [3], [4] and information stealers [5] that log affected users’ keystrokes, steal system information, and send stolen information to remote command-and-control (C&C) servers.

Analyses of the SEDNIT infectors that arrived as email attachments in the attacks featured in this paper revealed six distinct chains [see diagram on page 3].

Attack Timeline

The investigation focused on a group of attacks that has been dubbed “Operation Pawn Storm” [6] due to the attackers’ use of two or more connected tools/tactics to attack a specific target similar to the chess strategy it was named after. This paper illustrates how the Pawn Storm attacks were carried out with the aid of five spear-phishing emails, which used contextually relevant subjects to get specific targets from different countries to open weaponized attachments designed to compromise their systems.

The attackers sent emails to potential victims, including military, embassy, and defense contractor personnel. The following emails were among those that were found related to this operation:

- An email sent to a potential victim from the Ministry of Defense in France had an exploit for CVE-2010-3333 [7] disguised as a document named “International Military.rtf.” Trend Micro received a sample of this on October 17, 2011 and has been detecting it as TROJ_ARTIEF.AP [8] since then.

- An email sent to a potential victim working from the Vatican Embassy in Iraq used reports of a bombing incident [9] that occurred on January 9, 2012 as social engineering lure.
SEDNIT infectors attached to targeted attack campaign emails

Sent a day after the incident, the email had a Microsoft Word® file attachment named “IDF_Spokesperson_Terror_Attack_011012.doc,” which exploited CVE-2012-0158 [10].

Exploit for CVE-2012-0158 disguised as a Word (.DOC) file

Sample email sent to recipients from the Vatican Embassy in Iraq
• An email sent on September 20, 2013 to military officials from several countries used the then-upcoming “Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Indonesia 2013” conference as bait. The email had two Microsoft Excel® file attachments named “APEC Media list 2013 Part1.xls,” which exploited CVE-2012-0158, and “APEC Media list 2013 Part2.xls,” which was nonmalicious.

Sample email sent to military officials across countries using the “APEC Indonesia 2013” conference as bait

Exploit for CVE-2012-0158 disguised as an Excel (.XLS) file (APEC Media list 2013 Part1.xls)


Sample email sent to military officials from Pakistan using the “Homeland Security Summit Middle East” conference as bait

Exploit for CVE-2012-0158 disguised as a MIME HTML (.MHT) file

Attack Details

All of the observed Operation Pawn Storm attacks comprised several stages. Each attack had at least two phases:

• In phase 1, opening the email attachment displays a decoy document while the exploit runs in the background. The exploit drops a downloader component (.DLL file) named “netids.dll,” “netidt.dll,” or “coreshell.dll.”
• In phase 2, the downloader component communicates with a C&C server and downloads a dropper that ultimately installs a keylogger. After capturing information from infected systems, the keylogger sends data back to the C&C server.

Phases 1 and 2 in an Operation Pawn Storm attack

We only managed to collect latter-stage payloads for two out of the six aforementioned attacks. The C&C servers tied to the other four attacks refused to serve the rest of the files to complete the attack chains.

Multistage attacks are a double-edged sword. If one link in the attack chain, aside from the end node, is detected and removed in the initial infection stage, the entire attack fails. On the other hand, having several links in the attack chain makes detecting the final component more difficult. Tracing the previous and next links is also difficult when any of the components is inspected on its own outside the attack chain.

Although some of the C&C servers were still alive at the time of investigation, they did not respond to our infected systems. Repeated attempts to trick the C&C servers into serving the next files in the incomplete attack chains failed. The attacks they were tied to could be time sensitive and it is possible that they no longer hosted the files for succeeding stages.

Attack Evolution

Even though the filenames used for different components remained fairly consistent from 2010 to the present, earlier attacks were more elaborate and complex compared with those seen this year. The 2014 attacks we have seen were more streamlined.
Comparison of an Operation Pawn Storm attack in 2011 and another in 2014

Although variations in past and current attack chains exist, both are still being used by threat actors to date to ensure one thing—detection evasion. The following table compares and contrasts the six Operation Pawn Storm attacks in greater detail.
### Operation Pawn Storm Attack Comparison

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case 1</th>
<th>Case 2</th>
<th>Case 3 [13]</th>
<th>Case 4</th>
<th>Case 5</th>
<th>Case 6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Unknown exploit, possibly disguised as a .PDF, .DOC, or .RTF file, carries the top-level dropper (dropper.exe; SHA-1: 72cfd996957bde06a02b0adb2d66d8a9c25bf37) | .RTF file exploits CVE-2010-3333 (SHA-1: 956d1a36055c903cb570890da69deabaacb5a18a) and drops saver.scr (SHA-1: e8b55d9aef1f124df4008b0d372bf2f2d3e5e5ae7) | Unknown exploit carries a dropper (Dropper DLL; SHA-1: 9c622b39521183dd71ed2a174031ca159beb6479) | Two .XLS files come with spear-phishing emails:  
- First file (APEC Media list 2013 Part1.xls; SHA-1: a90921c182cb90870102ef402719ee8060910345) exploits CVE-2012-0158  
- Second file (APEC Media list 2013 Part2.xls; SHA-1: b309f99db1f60e27aecd0ca5a625aedab5899a) is a decoy document | .RTF file (SHA-1: 78d28072fdaf0b5aacc5ef337dc768d07b63e1e) exploits CVE-2012-0158 and drops saver.scr (SHA-1: 7FBB5A2E46FACD3EE0C945F324414210C2199FF) into <Local Settings>\Temp\ | .MHT file drops:  
- MH17.doc (SHA-1: DAE7FAA1725DB8192AD711D759B13F8195A18821), a decoy document, into <Local Settings>\Temp\  
- W.q (SHA-1: 8DEF0A554F1913445D3B3D2AE949F9500CE3D2DCE), a dropper, into <Local Settings>\Temp\ |
<table>
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<th>Case 4</th>
<th>Case 5</th>
<th>Case 6</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dropper.exe drops:</td>
<td>Saver.scr drops:</td>
<td>Dropper DLL drops</td>
<td>APEC Media list</td>
<td>Saver.scr drops:</td>
<td>W.q drops:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Decoy file (Letter to IAEA. pdf; SHA-1: 6ad a11c71a5176a8 2a8898680ed1e aa4e79b9bc3) into &lt;Local Settings&gt;</td>
<td>- Decoy document (Military Cooperation. doc; SHA-1: 0E 12C8AB9B89B6 EB6B3FC16C4B 3BBF9530067 963F) into &lt;Local Settings&gt;</td>
<td>netids.dll (SHA-1: dd 61530076152da5e6 8b4834b1999212c9 6c1a02) into &lt;Local Settings&gt;\Application Data</td>
<td>2013 Part1.xls drops dw20.t (SHA-1: ac6b 465a13370f87cf579 29b7c61e45c36945 85), a .DLL file</td>
<td>- IDF_Spokesperson_Targeted_Attack_101012.doc (SHA-1: F5 42C5F9259274 D94360013D14 FFB8ECC43AE 552), a decoy document, into &lt;Local Settings&gt;</td>
<td>- Coreshell.dll (SHA-1: A85513 97E1F1A2C014 8E6EADCB56F A35EE6009CA) into &lt;Program Files&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Downloader (netids.dll; SHA-1: c5ce5b7d10a cc04e4e45c3a 4dcf10d16b192e2f) into &lt;Local Settings&gt;</td>
<td>into &lt;Local Settings&gt;</td>
<td>into &lt;Local Settings&gt;</td>
<td>into &lt;Local Settings&gt;\Temp</td>
<td>into &lt;Local Settings&gt;</td>
<td>into &lt;Program Files&gt;\Common Files</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cryptmodule. exe (SHA-1: 4B 8806F8E0C84 9E44A5D8F877 66415A2DB1E9 A9) into &lt;AppData&gt;</td>
<td>Skype.exe (SHA-1: 550AB D71650B86A05 A0071C4E064A 003C8413C31), a SEDNIT variant, into &lt;Local Settings&gt;</td>
<td>Install.exe (SHA-1: BC58A 8550C53689C8 1B8021C917F B4AEE626AC 71) into &lt;Local Settings&gt;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>into &lt;Local Settings&gt;\Application Data</td>
<td>into &lt;Local Settings&gt;</td>
<td>into &lt;Local Settings&gt;\Temp</td>
<td></td>
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<th>Case 5</th>
<th>Case 6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **Netids.dll** communicates with a C&C server (200.106.145.122) | • *Military Cooperation.* *doc* has been encoded using Cyrillic characters and opens in Word  
• *Skype.exe* drops:  
  • Downloader (netids.dll; SHA-1: 6b87 5661a74c46 73ae6ee89a cc5cb6927ca 5f6dd), a SEDNIT variant, into `<Windows\system32>`  
  • Copy of netids.dll (mcsv. tmp) into `<Windows\system32>`  
  • Cryptmodule. exe drops s.vbs (actually a .PE and not a .VBS file) and communicates with a C&C server (windows. kz) | **Netids.dll** downloads and saves msmvs. exe (SHA-1: 88f7e27 1e54c127912db4db e9493793ea8a9c80c 9) in `<Local Settings>\Temp>` | **Dw20.t** drops netids. dll (SHA-1: 3814eec 8c45c4313a9c7f65c e882a7899cf0405) | **Install.exe** drops netids.dll (SHA-1: 14 BEEB0FC5C8C887 D0435009730B6370 BF94BC93) into `<Windows>\system32>` | **Coreshell.dll** downloads conhost. dll (SHA-1: B49FAD 3E5E6787E96373A C37ED58083F7572 D72A), a dropper, from a C&C server |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case 1</th>
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<th>Case 4</th>
<th>Case 5</th>
<th>Case 6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C&amp;C server confirms receipt of communication from infected systems then stops further interactions</td>
<td>• <em>Netids.dll</em> communicates with a C&amp;C server (70.85.221.20) • <em>S.vbs</em> (SHA-1: 0A3E6607D5E9C59C712106C355962B11DA29 02FC) runs <em>CreateFile C:\DOCUME<del>1\ADMINI</del>1\LOCALS~1\Temp\update.exe</em> but does nothing else</td>
<td><em>Msivs.exe</em> drops <em>conhost.dll</em> (SHA-1: 55318328511961EC339DFD0CA0443068DCCE9CD2) into <code>&lt;Local Settings&gt;\Temp&gt;</code></td>
<td><em>Netids.dll</em> communicates with a C&amp;C server (70.85.221.10)</td>
<td><em>Netids.dll</em> communicates with a C&amp;C server (70.85.221.10)</td>
<td><em>Conhost.dll</em> drops <em>advstoreshell.dll</em> (SHA-1: E338A57C35A4732BBB5F738E2387C1671A002BCB), a keylogger</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Netids.dll</strong> communicates with a C&amp;C server (70.85.221.20) <strong>S.vbs</strong> (SHA-1: 0A3E6607D5E9C59C712106C355962B11DA29 02FC) runs <em>CreateFile C:\DOCUME<del>1\ADMINI</del>1\LOCALS~1\Temp\update.exe</em> but does nothing else</td>
<td>• <em>Netids.dll</em> communicates with a C&amp;C server (70.85.221.20) • <em>S.vbs</em> (SHA-1: 0A3E6607D5E9C59C712106C355962B11DA29 02FC) runs <em>CreateFile C:\DOCUME<del>1\ADMINI</del>1\LOCALS~1\Temp\update.exe</em> but does nothing else</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<td><em>Netids.dll</em> communicates with a C&amp;C server (70.85.221.10)</td>
<td><em>Conhost.dll</em> drops <em>advstoreshell.dll</em> (SHA-1: E338A57C35A4732BBB5F738E2387C1671A002BCB), a keylogger</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><em>Netui.dll</em> sends logs of stolen data to a C&amp;C server (200.74.244.118)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Exploits Spread SEDNIT Malware in Poland

The threat actors behind Operation Pawn Storm spread SEDNIT malware via exploits on legitimate Polish websites. In September 2014, for instance, the Power Exchange website in Poland, www.irkit.pl, was compromised. The attackers rigged it with an iframe that pointed to http://defenceiq.us/2rKYZ_BGxPM and http://api.akmicdn.com/gpw?key=1072726955. The first link led to an exploit kit [14] that was responsible for spreading SEDNIT malware. The ESET paper did not mention that an earlier incident occurred in mid-July 2014 wherein a malicious iframe pointing to youtube.co was injected into Polish government websites though. And that the same domain, defenceiq.us, was used against Japanese targets in September 2014.

It is remarkable that a mass infection methodology was used by the Pawn Storm actors even though the actual SEDNIT samples were only served to particular targets. Actual exploitation was only triggered when certain criteria that had to do with OS, language settings, time zone, and installed software were met.

Next-Level Phishing Targets

The attackers used specially crafted emails to redirect targets to any of several phishing websites with domain names that were very similar to those of well-known conferences and media outfits. These websites did not host malicious content but visiting them did lead to the automatic execution of a nonmalicious JavaScript. Links to these fake websites were then embedded in spear-phishing emails and sent to selected targets.

Opening such an email and clicking the link in OWA redirected victims to fake OWA log-in pages by setting their browsers’ open windows property. The victims’ credentials thus ended up in the attackers’ hands.

Note that two special conditions need to be met for the attacks to succeed—victims should use OWA and click the embedded links via the web portal’s preview pane. The attacks worked on any popular browser such as Firefox®, Safari®, Chrome™, and Internet Explorer®. No vulnerabilities need to be exploited for the JavaScript to work.

Because many companies allow employees to use webmail services to access their mailboxes while on business travel or at home, these attacks are likely to succeed. Once they do, attackers can gain access to compromised mailboxes that they can then use to gain a foothold in target networks.

Throughout the course of investigation, several targets have been identified, including:

- ACADEMI, formerly Blackwater (United States)
- Broadcasting companies in various countries
- Military attachés from various countries
- Ministry of Defense (France)
- Ministry of Defense (Hungary)
- Multinational company based in Germany
- OSCE (Austria)
- Pakistani military officials
- Polish government employees
• SAIC (United States)
• U.S. Department of State
• Vatican Embassy (Iraq)

The following case studies reveal more in-depth details on four specific attacks.

CASE 1: MINISTRY OF DEFENSE, HUNGARY

• **Malicious conference domain:** eurosatory2014.com
• **Real conference domain:** eurosatory.com
• **Phished OWA domain:** mail.hm.gov.hu
• **Real OWA domain:** mail.hm.gov.hu

The attackers created a domain that was very similar to eurosatory.com [15], a website for an international land and air-land defense and security exhibition. They then sent emails with the link, http://eurosatory2014.com, to selected employees of the target defense ministry who might actually have been expecting to hear from the conference staff members.

Clicking the link embedded in the email via the OWA preview pane opens the real conference website in a new tab. The victims’ OWA session in the other tab, meanwhile, is redirected to a phished log-in page that makes it look like the session has ended.

In reality, the victims’ OWA session did not end. The previously mentioned JavaScript just redirected them to a fake OWA log-in page that looks just like the Ministry of Defense in Hungary’s real one.

Apart from “EUROSATORY 2014,” other conferences were also used to target employees of the Ministry of Defense in Hungary as shown in the following table.
Similar Attacks Against the Ministry of Defense, Hungary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conference</th>
<th>Target Domain</th>
<th>Malicious Domain</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“Africa Aerospace and Defence 2014”</td>
<td>aadexpo.co.za</td>
<td>aadexpo2014.co.za</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“The 10th Special Operations Forces Exhibition &amp; Conference”</td>
<td>sofexjordan.com</td>
<td>sofexjordan2014.com</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“ITEC”</td>
<td>itec.co.uk</td>
<td>itec2014.co.uk</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**CASE 2: OSCE, AUSTRIA**

- **Malicious news domain**: vice-news.com
- **Real news domain**: news.vice.com
- **Phished OWA domain**: log-in-osce.org
- **Real OWA domain**: log-in.osce.org

This attack targeted OSCE employees in Austria. Although the attackers used similar tactics, they did not spoof a conference website. They instead used a fake version of the news website, news.vice.com.

Even though OSCE provides better security for webmail users compared with the other targets via one-time session token use during log-in, attackers can still steal highly sensitive data from victims by hijacking a single session.

**CASE 3: SAIC, UNITED STATES**

- **Malicious conference domain**: natoexhibitionff14.com
- **Real conference domain**: natoexhibition.org
- **Phished OWA domain**: webmail-saic.com
- **Real OWA domain**: webmail.saic.com

This attack targeting SAIC was very similar to the first case. The attackers spoofed the website of the “Future Forces 2014” conference to trick email recipients into handing over their webmail credentials.

Comparison of the legitimate (top) and spoofed (bottom) OWA log-in pages of OSCE
CASE 4: ACADEMI

- **Malicious news domain:** tolonevvs.com
- **Real news domain:** tolonews.com
- **Phished OWA domain:** academl.com
- **Real OWA domain:** academi.com

This attack targeted the employees of U.S. defense contractor, ACADEMI, using the same phishing tactics as in the second case.

Apart from the four specific cases presented above, evidence pointing to a fake OWA server for a multinational company based in Germany was also discovered. The threat actors registered a domain that looked very similar to the target’s real domain and purchased a Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) certificate for the fake domain as part of preparations for a targeted attack. Trend Micro was able to warn the target early on, which helped thwart the threat.
Other Webmail Services

OWA users are not the only ones at risk though, as the threat actors behind Operation Pawn Storm also targeted users of free webmail services such as Gmail™, Live Mail, Yahoo!®, Hushmail, and Yandex.

Sample Gmail, Live Mail, Hushmail, and Yandex account phishing websites

We leaked specific credentials to the threat actors in a couple of cases to see if the fake webmail service log-in pages were indeed intended for attack use. Within minutes of leaking the test credentials, unauthorized log-ins were recorded. The first log-in was usually an automated log-in check from the same IP address as the phishing website’s owner. The succeeding log-ins were made from the IP addresses, 46.166.162.90 (Latvia) and 192.154.110.244 (United States), via Internet Message Access Protocol (IMAP). No other forms of abuse such as sending spam via the compromised accounts were witnessed. This showed that the attackers were indeed trying to obtain sensitive data from their targets instead of using their accounts for fraud and other financially motivated scams.
CONCLUSION

Operation Pawn Storm used next-level spear-phishing tactics to obtain the email credentials of primarily military, embassy, and defense contractor personnel from the United States and its allies. The threat actors used a mix of spear-phishing emails and specially crafted webmail service phishing websites to gain access to victims’ inboxes in hopes of getting better footholds inside target organizations. So as not to raise suspicion, the attackers used well-known events and conferences as social engineering bait. They have been quite persistent as well, as we have seen evidence that attacks have been going on since 2007.

Apart from effective phishing tactics, the threat actors used a combination of proven targeted attack staples to compromise systems and get in to target networks—exploits and data-stealing malware. SEDNIT variants particularly proved useful, as these allowed the threat actors to steal all manners of sensitive information from the victims’ computers while effectively evading detection.

Trend Micro has notified the targets that have been identified in this paper. Individuals and their respective organizations, meanwhile, should use solutions that can help protect against the various attack vectors that the threat actors behind Operation Pawn Storm used.

Messaging security solutions such as Trend Micro™ InterScan™ Messaging Security [16] and the ScanMail™ Suite for Microsoft Exchange [17] can send suspicious email attachments to a sandbox for analysis, thus protecting recipients from threats. Other products such as OfficeScan™ [18] for endpoints and InterScan Web Security Virtual Appliance [19] for gateways can also block user access to known phishing websites.

For overall protection against targeted attacks, Trend Micro™ Deep Discovery [20] can help protect potential targets by sandboxing and analyzing suspicious attachments to identify phishing emails via Email Inspector. Via 360-degree monitoring of network traffic to get networkwide visibility and intelligence, Deep Discovery allows users to detect and respond to targeted attacks and advanced threats. It also monitors all ports and more than 80 protocols, giving users the broadest protection available. Even more, specialized detection engines and custom sandboxing help identify and analyze malware, C&C communications, and evasive attacker activities that are invisible to standard security solutions. Along with in-depth threat intelligence, it allows for rapid response and automatic sharing with other security products to create real-time custom defense against attacks.
REFERENCES


Trend Micro Incorporated, a global leader in security software, strives to make the world safe for exchanging digital information. Our innovative solutions for consumers, businesses and governments provide layered content security to protect information on mobile devices, endpoints, gateways, servers and the cloud. All of our solutions are powered by cloud-based global threat intelligence, the Trend Micro™ Smart Protection Network™, and are supported by over 1,200 threat experts around the globe. For more information, visit www.trendmicro.com.

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